STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITS, AND THE DANGERS OF COLLABORATION:
THE IRONIC CASE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is widely known as the most
effective civil rights statute in history. This is an expected
distinction, as President Johnson asked for and ultimately signed
the “goddamnedest toughest” legislation possible. But the
President and the 89th Congress could not do this important work
alone. They knew that the substantive provisions of the statute
presented a difficult challenge to established constitutional norms
and for this reason they offered a broad and expansive statutory
canvass. In so doing, and as this Article argues, they implicitly
enlisted the U.S. Supreme Court as a key player in the fight against
voting discrimination. Unsure about the constitutional boundaries
at issue, Congress and the administration left many things unsaid,
wishing for the Court to extend the substantive provisions of the
Act as far as constitutionally permissible. This account turns the
conventional wisdom on its head. The Warren Court –widely
considered a bastion of liberal policy-making and judicial activism
– interpreted the statute precisely in accordance to congressional
wishes. Yet this proved to be a risky strategy, for as soon as the
Court’s composition changed, so did its collective view of the
statute. In other words, it is the Rehnquist Court who has
demonstrated a penchant for judicial activism under the guise of
strict constructionism. As Congress debates the upcoming
extension of the Voting Rights Act in 2007, this is a condition of the
Act to which Congress must close attention.
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“Bloody Sunday” had finally pushed the government into real
and direct action. In response to the violence on the Pettus
Bridge, which had been brought by the networks to living rooms
across the country, President Johnson had had enough.1 And he
was quite emphatic in his directive: he wanted the Department of
Justice to “prepare the 'goddamnedest toughest' voting-rights bill
possible.”2 And the Department of Justice did exactly that, with a
draft that ultimately became the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Among its many virtues, the Act adopted a trigger formula for
determining which jurisdictions would be covered under the
special provisions of the Act;3 it provided for the appointment of
federal examiners under certain conditions; and it bypassed the
cumbersome and time-consuming judicial process in order to
afford victims of discrimination effective access to the polls.4
Two features of the Act – its special provisions, which were
due to expire on August 6, 1970 – were particularly effective. One
was the aforementioned trigger formula, which automatically
brought within the coverage of the Act any jurisdiction that used
1 See TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN’S EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 196568, at 67 (2006) (“[President Johnson] had a politician’s respect for pressure,
and very likely realized that the tide of reaction to Sunday’s march was beyond
push-button control.”).
2 Howell Raines, MY SOUL IS RESTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH
REMEMBERED 337 (1977) (interview with Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General
during the Johnson Administration).
3 The special provisions of the bill were temporary in nature.
Under
section 4(b), a state would be covered under the Act if it used a literacy test as a
prerequisite to vote and its voter registration on November 1, 1964 or its voter
turnout rate on the 1964 Presidential election dipped below fifty percent. Those
states caught under 4(b) of the Act would need to preclear any changes to their
voting laws with a three judge District Court in the District of Columbia. See
Voting Rights Act of 1965, S. 1564, 89th Cong. § 8 (1965).
4 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, S. 1564, 89th Cong. (1965).
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literacy tests and either its turnout rate for the 1964 presidential
election or its registration rate on November 1, 1964 was below
fifty percent.5 The formula initially brought within the purview of
the Act the states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
South Carolina and Virginia, as well as 26 counties in North
Carolina. A second feature was the preclearance requirement.
Under section 5, these covered jurisdictions must submit any
proposed change in “voting qualifications or prerequisites to
voting, or standard, practices, or procedures” to the Department
of Justice – or they may seek a declaratory judgment in U. S.
District Court in the District of Columbia – for a determination
that the change does not have the purpose and will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race
or color.6
To many critics of the Act, and particularly those within the
jurisdictions that would bear the full force of its special
provisions, the proposed legislation was too tough. These critics
complained loudly and often that the legislation was
unconstitutional, as beyond the authority of Congress to enact.7
Yet criticism also came from unexpected quarters, most notably
Solicitor General Cox. In a memorandum to the Attorney
General, Cox argued that the formula for determining which
jurisdictions were covered under the Act was simply irrational. To
his mind, “[o]ne might equally well make the Act applicable to any
State whose name begins with Vi or Mi or Lo or Al or Ge or So.
Indeed,” he continued, “since even this description covers Alaska
as well as Alabama, it has exactly the same effect as the
determinations now required to be made.”8

42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973p (2004).
Id.
7 See, e.g., Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S. 1564 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 57 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate
Hearings] (Senator Ervin); Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before
Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 716 (1965)
[hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of Representative Long).
8 Solicitor General Cox to the Attorney General 1 (March 23, 1965) (Justice
Department Administrative History, Civil Rights, Lyndon B. Johnson Library).
Interestingly, during the Senate hearings on March 24, 1965, Senator Ervin
doubted whether everyone within the Department of Justice agreed with the
Attorney General about the constitutionality of the Act. The Attorney General
responded: “I can say that I have consulted on this with the top officials in the
Department of Justice and they agree. I include on that the Solicitor General
who has to argue the case.” 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 91
(testimony of Attorney General Katzenbach); see id. at 140 (upon questioning by
5

6
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In hindsight, it is beyond reason to have expected the
Supreme Court to strike down this important statute. The Court
put all doubts to rest in Morgan9 and South Carolina,10 but the
story of the Act and its constitutional odyssey only began with
these cases. To be sure, Congress and the administration went as
far as they thought they could go; this was the “toughest” bill they
deemed possible on both political and constitutional grounds. Yet
it is also clear from the historical record that the drafters of the
bill wanted to push the provisions of the statute as far as existing
constitutional limits allowed. Put another way, Congress knew
that it had the power to act; the real question was about how far
the substantive coverage of the statute could go.
Enter the Supreme Court. From the moment the Court was
asked to interpret the substantive provisions of the statute, it did
so broadly and assertively.11 This conduct has been subject to
much criticism; namely, that the Court has played fast and loose
with the statutory language and what it proclaims to be the intent
of Congress. In other words, it is the conventional wisdom that
the Court has filled out the contours of this broad and expansive
statute not by the demands of traditional methods of statutory
interpretation, but by what it determines to be sound public
policy.12 This criticism applies with particular poignancy to the

Senator Hart, the Attorney General remarked that the Solicitor General believed
the bill to be constitutional, yet his opinion was not in written form).
9 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
10 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
11 See Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
12 See Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 818,
S. 2456, S. 2507 and Title IV of S. 2029 Before the Senate Subcomm on Const.
Rts. of the Judiciary Committee, 91st Cong. 5 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Senate
Hearings] (“This case (Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969)) is
yet another example of the Court’s habit of redoing the work of Congress to
conform with its own notions of desirable legislation.”) (Senator Ervin). For
some of the cases, see Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971); Georgia v.
United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140
(1976); Reno v. Bossier Parrish School Board, 528 U.S. 320 (2000). For
criticisms of the Court’s approach in particular cases, see, for example, Holder v.
Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 895-96 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 935 (“Not
surprisingly, the legislative history relied upon in Allen also displayed the typical
flaws that one might expect – it was hardly unequivocal.”); Allen, 393 U.S. at
583, 585 (labeling Allen an “extremely broad construction of § 5,” and
complaining that “the Court has now construed § 5 to require a revolutionary
innovation in American government”) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 146 (1976) (contending
that “the congressional purposes in § 5 are no longer served and the sacred
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early treatment of the statute by the Warren Court and the early
Burger Court.
This Article turns the conventional wisdom on its head. It
contends that the early history of the Act has played out precisely
as Congress intended.
Out of concern for overstepping
constitutional bounds, the administration and members of
Congress drafted a broad statute, short on specifics and as farreaching as they deemed constitutionally possible. In response to
a question from Representative Cramer, for example, Attorney
General Katzenbach explained: “If the Congressman can suggest
an effective means that covers everything that is covered by this
act and can cover other areas and still be constitutional, I am sure
that the administration would be most happy to consider that. We
don’t want discrimination anywhere.”13 The Attorney General
repeated this position often. The broad contours of the Act were
clear: to eliminate the “blight of racial discrimination in voting.”14
Some witnesses and members of Congress wished for the bill to
assert far more directly the reach of the Act,15 but the legislation
ultimately failed to reflect these efforts. The language remained
broad and expansive, which offered a willing interpreter the room
to expand the scope of the statute as necessary.
From this record, this Article argues that Congress intended
for the Court to extend the substantive provisions of the Act as far
as constitutionally permissible. To be fair, direct evidence for this
conclusion is scarce in the early legislative history, for Congress
could not even be sure – although the Attorney General was very
optimistic on this score16 – whether the constitutionality of the Act
would bear judicial scrutiny. But Congress and the administration
did make clear, time and again, that they wished to take the
substantive provisions of the Act as far as constitutionally
possible. The Court could thus interpret the Act as broadly as it
wished, confident in the view that Congress would support its
interpretation. Ironically, the temporary nature of the special
guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments emerge badly
battered”) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
13 1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 90.
14 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
15 See, e.g., 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 192 (objecting to
Senator Fong’s suggestion to clarify the original section 9(a) of the Act).
16 See id. at 249 (“I think if anything [his opinion about the
constitutionality of the bill] has been strengthened, Senator, because under such
rigorous and learned cross examination as I have had on this point, my
convictions remains the same, and I have confidence in the constitutionality of
the bill.”).
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provisions of the Act proved helpful on this score, as Congress had
many opportunities to comment on – and demonstrate approval
for – the Court’s handiwork. Hence, the strategy played out
across decades and the various extensions of the Act.
Yet it has also has proven to be a risky strategy; while it is true
that the Court understood its role as a conduit for congressional
intent broadly defined and as understood early on, it is also fair to
say that in more recent years, the Court has shown very little
interest in remaining faithful to the intent of Congress.17
Ironically, this has meant that the Court followed the intent of
Congress in those very cases that are traditionally considered to
be activist decisions, while the more recent Rehnquist Court
decisions narrowing the scope of the statute have turned away
from that original intent. Hence the irony: the Supreme Court’s
handling of the Voting Rights Act offers an inimitable example of
judicial activism clothed in the fabric of strict constructionism.
This Article defends this reading of the congressional record
and the Court’s activism over the course of four parts. Part I
examines the constitutional arguments made in defense of and
against the Act. Of necessity, this Part looks with particular care to
the Senate hearings, a setting that proved far more critical of the
proposed legislation. Part II offers a short history of the Act and
shows how Congress arrived at some of the critical language of the
statute. This Part concludes that Congress had an ambitious
agenda in mind, yet remained mindful that taking its proposal too
far would run into constitutional difficulties.
Part III considers how these arguments fared in court and
ultimately defends the Court and its broad readings of the statute.
In this vein, this Part counsels against looking for evidence of
legislative intent prior to the enactment of the relevant provisions.
After all, Congress intended to go as far as the Court would allow
it to go. Instead of looking for evidence of intent in the legislative
history as traditionally understood, it stands to reason that
congressional hearings coming on the heels of a judicial
interpretation of the Act would offer a much better guide to the
intent of Congress. This is a recurring theme in many of the
congressional debates over extension of the Act, as Congress
subsequently approves of – and even comes to expect – many of
the broad readings of the provisions under review. In this vein, it
is telling that Congress has seen fit to correct a judicial
interpretation of the Act in only a few select instances.
17 See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976); Reno v. Bossier
Parrish School Board, 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
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This Article concludes that the Supreme Court has played a
unique role in this field. When interpreting the Voting Rights Act,
Congress has wished for the Court to act assertively while offering
broad readings of the relevant statutory language. But the Court
has not always been a faithful interpreter of congressional intent
broadly understood. In closing, Part IV examines the ebbs and
flows of judicial review, and particularly the Court’s seemingly
inconsistent approach to interpreting the statute.
More
specifically, this Part contends that the Court behaves as we would
expect it to behave, as a national policy-maker closely attuned to
larger political trends. These perceived shifts are nothing more
than reflections on a Court whose behavior is seldom out of step
for long with trends in public opinion. Before concluding, this
Part also examines some of the implications of this view, in
particular reference to the looming reauthorization of the Act in
2007.
I. The Constitution in Congress: 1965
This first Part examines the constitutional debate surrounding
the proposed voting rights bill. In particular, it highlights the
momentousness of this occasion and the degree to which the bill
pushed awfully hard at myriad constitutional norms. The
Constitution was in the minds of all the participants, many of
whom never tired to cite past Supreme Court opinions in support
of their positions. The sponsors of the bill were no different in
this regard. As for the critics of the proposed legislation, they
waged perhaps their strongest battle on the constitutionality of
the bill. This was a constant theme in both the House and Senate
hearings.
The Attorney General stated early in the hearings the
administration’s view that the proposed bill was a constitutional
means of enforcing the commands of the 15th Amendment. In
particular, he contended that the bill set up working categories
under which it classified the states in accordance to the triggering
formula, and “[g]iven a factual premise – as we have here – it is
for Congress to set the boundaries. That is essentially a legislative
function which the courts do not and cannot quibble about.”18
This was a basic question of constitutional authority, which he
argued the 15th Amendment conferred upon Congress. This

18

1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 14.
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argument relied in part on recent judicial decisions,19 a point that
some critics of the legislation grudgingly conceded.20
In response, critics of the administration bill argued that the
proposed legislation would “destroy” the Constitution21 and would
require “throwing the Constitution of your country out the
window.”22 These arguments took many forms. One leading
criticism of the bill contended that the Act was beyond the powers
of Congress under section 2 of the fifteenth amendment.23 A
second criticism contended that the legislation was both a bill of
attainder and an ex post fact law, in violation of Article I, section
9.24 The Attorney General disagreed with both criticisms; on the

See, e.g., id. at 112 (“Congressman, an awful lot of our constitutional
arguments were made, as I am sure you recall, with respect to the 1964 act. I
think they were sincerely made and we were able to persuade nine justices of the
Supreme Court as to our position and the constitutionality of that bill.”); see also
id. at 385 (“I do not even consider this a close question because I think the
people talking about it do not reckon with the fact that the Supreme Court has
never in recent history questioned Congress judgment in this area.”) (testimony
of Joseph Rauh, counsel for the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights).
20 Id. at 626 (“Possibly in these days it is vain to advance constitutional
questions, in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has assumed the power to
amend the Constitution by judicial decree, and the executive is here demanding
that Congress amend it by legislative act, wholly ignoring the plain provisions of
the Constitution.”) (statement of Representative Dowdy).
21 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 77 (statement of Senator Ervin).
22 Id. at 155 (Statement of Senator Eastland); see id. at 57 (making a
constitutional argument against the bill while disagreeing with a recent Supreme
Court case) (Senator Ervin); id. at 548 (“You are violating the Constitution and
your sworn duty to uphold the Constitution, and the provisions are too plain and
too clear. Nobody is dumb enough not to understand that.”) (statement of Judge
L. H. Perez, representing Governor John J. McKeithen of Louisiana); id. at 615
(arguing that the bill is unconstitutional) (statement of Paul Rodgers, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General of Georgia). To be fair, supporters of the legislation
also worried abut the constitutionality of the bill. See, e.g., id. at 140 (asking the
Attorney General about the constitutionality of the bill and the Solicitor
General’s views) (statement of Senator Hart).
23 See, e.g., id. at 59, 60, 63.
24 For example, Senator Ervin defined an ex post facto law as a law that
“imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time of
commitment or imposes additional punishment to that prescribed or changes the
rule of evidence by which less or different testimony is sufficient to convict tan
was then required.” Id. at 63. Under this definition, the proposed bill is an ex
post facto law, since “a State or political subdivision was not subjected to the
punishment of being deprived of their power to prescribe and administer literacy
tests by the fact that less than 50 percent of their people of voting age failed to
vote in the presidential election of 1964.” Id. He similarly complained that the
legislation amounted to a bill of attainder. See, e.g., id. at 64-5:
19
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first, he argued that “where the Congress is given an express
power to implement a provision of the Constitution it may adopt
any reasonable and appropriate means for doing so.”25 He also
disagreed that this was either a bill of attainder or an ex post facto
law, as the bill “is not a punishment.”26
The critics also took the banner of states’ rights and
complained that “[y]ou would just as well wipe out your State
lines if this theory of legislation is held constitutional,”27 Behind
these general assertions of unconstitutionality sprinkled
throughout the hearings, two basic grounds of disagreement
emerged. One argument focused on the rights of states to set their
voters’ qualifications,28 a position considerably strengthened by
the Court’s holding in Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board.29
The Attorney General responded to this argument as follows:
The constitutional rule is clear: So long as State
laws or practices erecting voting qualifications for
non-Federal elections do not run afoul of the 14th of
15th Amendments, they stand undisturbed. But
when State power is abused – as it is plainly in the

Despite my respect for your opinion, I think this bill
constitutes a bill of attainder as it deprives the States, certain
States and certain counties of certain States which are defined
in terms by the act itself, and election officials in those States,
and counties, of certain powers vested in the States and
political subdivisions of the States. It does this without a
judicial trial, and furthermore, it does this on the basis of a fact
completed in the past.
Id. at 88; see id. at 674 (statement of Thomas Watkins).
Id. at 63.
27 Id. at 293 (Statement of Attorney Bloch); see id. at 309 (branding the
Act a “conspiracy to destroy our State laws for voter qualifications”) (statement
of Judge Perez).
28 See id. at 112 (“I am convinced that there is a serious question of States’
rights or National rights.”) (testimony of Representative Ashmore); id. at 601
(“you are infringing upon and usurping States rights when you impose Federal
determination of voting qualifications under the 15th Amendment.”) (testimony
of Daniel McLeod, Attorney General of South Carolina); id. at 755 (contending
that the legislation is beyond constitutional authority, as the states have the right
to set voter qualifications) (testimony of Representative Whitener).
29 360 U.S. 45 (1959). In Lassiter, the Court held that a state may impose
literacy tests as voting qualifications so long as it does not apply them in
discriminatory fashion. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 113 (arguing
that the bill is forcing the states to do something that the Court said they do not
have to do) (testimony of Representative Ashmore).
25

26
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areas affected by the present bill – there is no
magic in the words “voting qualifications.”30
Put another way, the states’ right to set their voting qualifications
was not absolute; it went only as far as the commands of the 14th
and 15th Amendment began. A state may not violate these
commands under the guise of erecting “voting qualifications.”
A related argument focused on the inevitable over-inclusive
nature of the trigger formula. During a prolonged exchange with
the Attorney General, for example, Representative Cramer
argued: “What constitutional basis is there for that where the
effect is obviously to strike down the States’ constitutional rights
to fix voter qualifications in areas where no discrimination has
been found to exist?”31 This point had a great deal of force. Recall
that under the trigger provision of the bill, a state or political
subdivision would come under the purview of the Act if it made
use of a literacy test and less than fifty-percent of its voters were
registered on November 1, 1964, or its voter turnout dipped under
fifty-percent for the 1964 Presidential election. Of necessity, this
would mean that some jurisdictions that were free of
discrimination would come under the provisions of the bill. And
yet, if the 15th Amendment proscribes racial discrimination in
voting, and Congress is seeking to enforce this amendment by
appropriate legislation, how could Congress designate as covered
jurisdictions areas with no proven instances of such
discrimination?
To the Attorney General, however, these areas of no
discrimination within a larger discriminatory jurisdiction are
exceptions, and “cannot be used as a proper support for saying . . .
you can’t regulate other units within the State or the State as a
whole.”32 After all, he argued elsewhere, “the fact that you are not
cutting with absolute surgical skill and may pick up some other
area is not of vital importance and is constitutionally irrelevant.”33
On this point, he felt so confident about the administration’s
course of action and the constitutionality of the bill that he did not
“even see a constitutional difficulty.”34 So long as Congress acted
reasonably, the legislation would bear scrutiny.

Id. 15.
Id. at 88.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 82.
34 Id. at 88.
30
31
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II. Shooting for the Stars and Settling on the Particulars
A. Advocacy and Stargazing
This last point, whether Congress acted reasonably, applied
not only to the particular provisions of the 1965 Act, but also to
the perceived need for a voting rights bill coming on the heels of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Attorney General confronted this
issue often. In the words of Representative Kastenmeier, for
example, “this committee and the Congress ought to be especially
sensitive in passing a bill this year, not merely because of the
obvious demand and need for it, but because we passed a bill in
1957, 1960, and in 1963-64.”35 The Attorney General answered
that those prior efforts relied on the good faith of the states and
local jurisdictions in enforcing the provisions of the law. The new
Act, in contrast, would “no longer rely on good faith. . . . [W]e are
not going to be frustrated again by the long and tedious delays
and resort to law as a delaying device.”36 In other words, the
administration was no longer willing to make use of traditional
modes of adjudication. In light of earlier failures, a stronger yet
more efficient approach was warranted.
Yet, to its credit, the administration also sent a clear message
from the beginning of the hearings that the proposed bill went as
far as the administration thought that any legislation could go in
light of relevant constitutional proscriptions. “I have indicated
repeatedly,” the Attorney General conceded, “I am entirely
sympathetic with doing so if we can find a constitutional means
and a practical means of doing so. I confess that my ingenuity has
floored in that regard.”37 And in response to a query from Senator
Tydings, the Attorney General similarly explained: “[W]e were
unable to draft a law where we could have the same objective
criteria which we felt would stand up constitutionally and still
cope with this kind of situation. . . . It wasn’t done from a desire to

35 Id. at 66; see id. at 112 (Representative Ashmore); see also 1965 Senate
Hearings, supra note 7, at 105-08 (Senator Ervin); id. at 155 (Senator Eastland);
id. at 668 (“I respectfully remind the committee that the bill was offered only 8
months after passage of title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . . This, I submit
respectfully, is much too short a time within which to determine whether this
recently passed legislation is adequate.”) (statement of Thomas Watkins).
36 1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 67.
37 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 183.
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permit any discrimination in voting, but merely because we
couldn’t devise a better law than this to deal with it.”38
For this reason, Attorney General Katzenbach seemed willing
at various times to let others try their hand at the problem. For
example, in response to Representative Rodino’s question
whether he “believe[d] that this bill, with the provisions that have
been written into it, [was] the surest way of guaranteeing that the
right to vote will not be denied to any citizen regardless of race or
color?,”39 Katzenback responded: “If this committee can come up
with a better way of doing it and a surer way of doing it, I am sure
the administration would support that way of doing it. This is the
best we have been able to accomplish.”40 Similarly, in response to
Representative Cramer’s contention about the inadequacy of the
legislation’s coverage, and particularly his question whether
Katzenbach “would not object to any member of this committee
making an exploration in that area,” the Attorney General
explained: “Anything that will be in this direction and make it
constitutional, I am all for it.”41 He repeated this sentiment
throughout his testimony in both hearings.42 This willingness to
consider different avenues of reform extended to the particular
language of the statute.43

38 Id. at 143; see Id. at 148 (explaining in response to a suggested change in the
language of the statute that “I have reservations that that would be sound
constitutionally” ).
39 Id. at 49.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 70. Moments later, Cramer repeated his point that the legislation
failed to offer sufficient coverage to areas in need. “As the President said in his
message, with which I agree, that discrimination in every community in America,
wherever it exists, must be stamped out relating to voting. The bill does not do
it.” Id. at 79. In response, the Attorney General repeated his position. “Most
respectfully, Congressman, I believe the bill does it as well as we have been able
to devise a system for doing it. Now, if there are better ways of doing it, as I said
before, I would certainly be strongly in support of those.” Id.; see id. at 146 (“But
it wasn’t drafted to exclude any areas where discrimination was practiced, it was
just that we lacked the skill and ingenuity to find a formula that would
accomplish that result. If the Senator has one, I would be happy to hear it.”).
42 See, e.g., id. at 90 (“If the Congressman can suggest an effective means
that covers everything that is covered by this act and can cover other areas and
still be constitutional, I am sure that the administration would be most happy to
consider that. We don’t want discrimination anywhere.”).
43 See, e.g., id. at 58 (“The intention, Mr. Chairman, is what I stated.
Perhaps the Committee will want to clarify the language.”) (Burke Marshall); id.
at 63 (“If you can suggest, sir, language that makes it crystal clear what
intimidation is, I would think that would represent a substantial improvement in
the bill.”) (Katzenbach); Id. at 85 (“Perhaps there is a better way of doing it,
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Many members of Congress and prominent witnesses who
spoke in support of the bill got the message. The House hearings
figure prominently on this score, as they offered a rather amicable
forum where the proposed bill received a warm and receptive
welcome. This is a setting where the relevant actors could focus
on the goal at hand and how best to accomplish it. During his
testimony on March 24th, for example, Roy Wilkins, executive
director of the NAACP, remarked: “All we want is that nothing
shall be considered good enough until it has reached the limit of
constitutional interpretation and of practical and pragmatic
possibility that you mention.”44 Representative Lindsay similarly
asked a few days earlier: “with this mood in the country and the
willingness of the members to get through a voting rights bill, and
I think it will be a large majority, too, by which it would go
through, can’t we try to do a little bit more?”45 But Chairman
Celler put it best, on the last day of the hearings and in reference
to Joseph Rauh, Jr., counsel for the Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights: “I have great respect for Mr. Rauh, but sometimes he
is a stargazer, and that is a creditable term. But we must be
practical.”46 Congress could only go so far.

Senator, but I am sure if we are in agreement as to what it is intended to say that
with all of your skill we can find a way of saying that which satisfies you.”).
44 1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 403.
45 Id. at 109.
46 Id. at 693.
To which Mr. Rauh responded: “I admire you both
(Congressmen Celler and Rogers) but representing the amalgamated stargazers I
have something I would like to present to you.” Id. at 694.
Chairman Celler repeated this admonition often. For example, and in
response to a request by James Farmer, National Director of CORE, for an
expansion of the reach of the bill, he explained:
No bill may go far enough but you must consider that if you
weight this bill down with too much, you may get into serious
difficulty, and you may not get anything.
You must remember that we must be pragmatic here in this
committee, we must be very careful that we do not incur too
many hostile votes on this bill. That must be remembered also
by the general public as well as organizations like your own
and we labor under considerable difficulties in that regard.
Id. at 686.
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B. Tinkering with the Details: Procedures and Political
Subdivisions
The message throughout the hearings was clear: Congress
must go as far as politically and constitutionally possible. With
this goal in mind, both houses of Congress kept tinkering with the
language of the statute and the reach of its many provisions. The
remaining of this Part discusses two particular provisions. First,
many members of Congress pressed the Attorney General for
clearer statutory guidance on the definition of the term “political
subdivision.” This was an important definition, for the reach of
the original trigger provision under section 3 (a) of the bill,47 as
well as the preclearance provision under the original section 8,48
extended to both states and “political subdivisions.” During the
House hearings, Representative McCulloch defined the phrase as
“any school district, borough, township, county, or any other
political subdivision within the meaning of the State law.”49 In
response, the Attorney General narrowed the definition; “we are
aiming at voter registration,” he explained, “and I think the term
‘political subdivision’ is used here aimed primarily at the area in
which the registration process takes place.”50 He then suggested
that “[t]hat may be a point which should be clarified.”51
Senator Ervin raised a similar query during the Senate
hearings, and the Attorney General repeated his view that “we are
talking about the area in which people are registered, the
appropriate unit for registering.”52 In his view, “we are talking
about no area smaller than a county or parish.”53 Yet on the
language of the statute as then drafted, its reach seemed
considerable; in North Carolina, for example, “every municipality
is a political subdivision of the State, even every sanitary district is
a subdivision of the State.”54 Hence, Senator Ervin deemed
necessary to amend the bill, and the Attorney General concurred.
“I think that might be done to define political subdivision here in
the bill in that way. That is what I intended.”55
See Voting Rights Act of 1965, S. 1564, 89th Cong. § 3 (a) (1965).
See id. at § 8.
49 1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 51.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 44.
53 Id.
54 Id. (Senator Ervin).
55 Id.
47

48
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In the end, both the Senate and House committees responded
to these concerns during their executive sessions. The House bill
included in section 14 (c)(2) the following definition: “The term
political subdivision shall mean any county or parish, except that
where registration for voting is not conducted under the
supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other
subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.”56
The Senate bill offered a substantially similar definition.57
Second, the original language of section 2 read as follows:
“No voting qualification or procedure shall be imposed or applied
to deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race or color.”58
Senator Fong expressed concern that the bill did not define the
word “procedure,” and he was “afraid that there may be certain
practices that you may not be able to include in the word
‘procedure.’”59
The Attorney General understood the term
broadly, yet Senator Fong asked him whether, “[t]he way is now
written, do you think there may be a possibility that the Court
would hassle over the word ‘procedure’?”60 The Attorney General
did not think so, yet allowed that language in the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 used the terms “standards, practices, or procedures,” and
“[p]erhaps that would be broader than simply the word procedure
and perhaps the committee might consider making that point
clear.”61
To be sure, and in response to a further question by the
Senator, the Attorney General indicated that he was not opposed
to expanding the word, as “it was intended to be all-inclusive of
any kind of practice.”62 Senator Fong pressed on, and contrasted
the way in which section 3(a) defined the terms “test or device” in
some detail; “[b]ut you have not spelled out the word ‘procedure.
I think that the word ‘procedure’ should be spelled out a little bit
more.”63 The Attorney General agreed,64 and both the House and
56 To Enforce the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States: Unpublished Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before the House Comm. on Rules,
89th Cong. 28 (1965) [hereinafter House Unpublished Hearings].
57 To Enforce the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States: Executive Session on S.R. 1564 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 5 (1965) [hereinafter Senate Executive Session].
58 Voting Rights Act of 1965, S. 1564, 89th Cong. § 2 (1965).
59 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 191.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 191-92.
62 Id. at 192.
63 Id.
64 Id. (“I think that is a good suggestion, Senator.”).
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the Senate committees ultimately concurred as well. Under the
amended section 2 of the bill, “No voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be
imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color.”65
The lessons of this Part should be clear. As Senator Dirksen
remarked on April 6, while the Senate committee met in executive
session: “So I must say that a tremendous amount of work has
gone into this proposal.”66 The draft of the bill then under
consideration was at least the fifth version of the bill, and “[t]he
reason for it,” he explained, was that “as these suggestions came
in on the course of the hearings, they had to evaluate them and
see whether they should be seriously considered.”67 Congress was
listening, and taking the voting rights bill and its provisions as far
as possible, mindful of existing constitutional and political limits.
The political limits were few, as Representative Lindsay
underscored, for the bill had the support of substantial
congressional majorities. As for the constitutional limits and the
Attorney General’s optimism, a legal challenge loomed in the
horizon. The critics would not give up easily.
C. The Collaborative Approach
From these realities as Congress understood them, the
solution was brilliant in its simplicity. Note first that Congress
knew the extent of the problem and how difficult was to tailor an
effective solution, as seen by its previous efforts in 1957, 1960, and
1964. Note also that as far as Congress was concerned, this was
not a question of unavailability of power, for Congress was
confident that it had the power under the 15th Amendment to do
something about this problem. So the real question for Congress
was, how far could the substantive provisions of the bill go?
In response, the administration offered a statute whose
language remained broad in scope. Such broad language, coupled
with a clear intent to push the statute as far as constitutionally
permissible, offered the Supreme Court a conduit through which it
may carry out the intent of Congress and the administration. And
this intent was unmistakable: to fight the blight of racial
65 House Unpublished Hearings, supra note 56, at 11; see Senate
Executive Session, supra note 57, at 4.
66 Id. at 3.
67 Id.
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discrimination and “to open the city of hope to all people of all
races.”68 Hence, the Court may do its traditional job of statutory
interpretation under unique circumstances, for it may legitimately
interpret section 5 – and the Voting Rights Act in general –
expansively, up to the limits of constitutional interpretation as the
Court itself understood them.
This strategy might appear risky, to be sure, for it hinged on
the Court and its willingness to go along. Yet this was the same
Court whose members stood and clapped during Johnson’s
address, a fact hardly lost on critics of the bill. As James
Kilpatrick, vice-chairman of the Virginia Commission on
Constitutional Government and one of the more thoughtful critics
of the bill, complained, “it is . . . unfortunate that member of the
Supreme Court of the United States appeared – turned up to here
[sic] the President’s message and appeared on the television
cameras applauding. I think this is a violation of the separation of
powers of the United States and creates imbalances.”69 Former
Representative Albert Watson similarly concluded: “Where else
can we turn? We see the Supreme Court sitting on the House floor
wildly applauding legislative recommendations. Can we expect
impartial examination of these proposals by that body if they
become law?”70 Congress thus had a very good inkling that the
Court would go along. The Court could be trusted to do its part in
this important project.
Consider, for example, section 5 of the Act, its preclearance
provision. On its terms, a covered “state or political subdivision”
covered under section 4(b) of the Act must preclear any new
“voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting.” In turn, the
Attorney General and/or the District Court must ensure that
“such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure
does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”71
The reasons for this provision were obvious. According to the
Attorney General,
absent a provision of this kind, you leave it upon a
State to devise, if it can, some new method of
68 Lyndon B. Johnson, We Shall Overcome, in SPEECHES OF THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENTS 637, 641 (Janet Podell and Steven Anzovin eds., 1988).
69 1965 Senate hearings, supra note 7, at 642.
70 1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 623.
71
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2004).
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preventing people from voting on grounds of race,
and then go through the painfully long litigation
process. . . . This is an attempt to prevent new laws
which would frustrate the objectives of Congress
here.72
More specifically, he argued elsewhere, “the effort here was to get
at things that were not included within the words ‘tests and
devices.’ And the thought that other things that violated the 15th
Amendment by a State should also be subjected to judicial
review.”73 This was thus an effort to extend the substantive
coverage of the Act in ways that neither Congress nor the
administration could foresee in 1965.
In order for the preclearance provision to perform this
function, its language must remain broad and flexible. And the
text of section 5 was clearly that, to the chagrin of some critics
who complained that the language was too broad.74
The
implications of this choice were clear. Do not limit the language
of the statute and concomitantly trust the Court to play an
important part in extending the provisions of the statute as
necessary, and “to the limits of constitutional interpretation.”75

72

1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 172; see id. at 237:
It occurred to us that there are other ways in which States can
discriminate, and we have had experience with State legislative
efforts in other areas, for example, limiting the registrars to
very short periods of time, or the imposition of either very high
poll taxes or property taxes which would have the effect of
denying or abridging rights guaranteed under the 15th
Amendment, that kind of law should be covered, too.

See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966) (“Congress
knew that some of the States covered by § 4(b) of the Act had resorted to the
extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kind for the sole
purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal
decrees.”).
73 Id. at 237; see id.: “The effort is to prevent this constant slowing down
process which occurs when States enact new laws that may clearly be in violation
of the 15th Amendment, but you have to go through the process of getting judicial
determinations of that. It takes a long time. In the interval the purposes of the
act are frustrated.”
74 See id. at 622 (“Well, now, procedures for voting, that is an extremely
broad term. . . . We certainly think that legislation should modify procedures in
order to limit the scope. That is all this act is concerned with, anyway, so the
language is way too broad.”) (Rogers).
75
1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 403 (remarks of Roy Wilkins).
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far as the Constitution allows. In other words, enlist the
Court as a partner in carrying out these important goals.
III. The Act in Court: A Voting Rights Colloquy
Almost as soon as the President signed the bill into law on
August 6th, 1965, critics of the bill sought a judicial ruling on its
constitutionality. And within a year, the Court issued its
landmark decisions of South Carolina v. Katzenbach and
Katzenbach v. Morgan. Both cases sided with the government
while sanctioning a very strong assertion of federal power. This
Part examines the life of the Act in court. It concludes that the
Court has dominated the debate over the substance of the Act and
Congress has willingly acquiesced, with some notable exceptions.
In turn, this dominance has meant that the substance of the Act
has fluctuated with the moods of the Court; while the Court often
interpreted the Act broadly and liberally, it has also done so in
narrow fashion.
A. Mr. Katzenbach Goes to Washington: The Look of a
Dahlian Court
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,76 the Court acknowledged
that the Act established “stringent new remedies,”77 and some of
its provisions were “inventive”78 and “uncommon.”79 Yet the
Court recognized that “exceptional conditions can justify
legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.”80 And further,
Congress was not acting rashly and hastily but, rather, it “explored
with great care the problem of racial discrimination in voting.”81
383 U.S. 301 (1966).
Id. at 308.
78 Id. at 327.
79 Id. at 334.
80 Id.
81 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). The critics disagreed with this point, to be
sure, and vehemently so. See 1965 Senate Hearing, supra note 7, at 54
(“Congress has rarely been called upon to enact a law which bears on its face the
marks of having been written in such haste as this one.”) (Senator Ervin); id. at
616 (“The bill was rather hazily drawn and I think it is obvious”) (Rodgers); see
also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 623 (“All of us know, Mr. Chairman,
that the support of this measure is primarily the result of mass hysteria created
and nurtured by the national press.”) (statement of former Representative
Watson). While Senator Ervin repeated this complaint often, see id. at 54, 235,
593, the Attorney General denied it. See id. at 54 (“It wasn’t written in all that
76
77
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Thus on the record before it, the Court concluded that the means
used by Congress were a legitimate, permissible response to the
problem at hand.82 “After enduring nearly a century of systematic
resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment,” the Court explained in a
moment of great candor, “Congress might well decide to shift the
advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to
its victims.”83 Deference to Congress was the order of the day.
Similarly, in Morgan v. Katzenbach,84 the Court upheld
Section 4 (e) of the Act, which provided that no person who has
completed a sixth grade education in a school accredited by the
commonwealth of Puerto Rico shall be denied the right to vote on
account of an inability to read or write English. This provision ran
into direct conflict with the recent precedent established by
Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board,85 a case decided a scant
6 years earlier, where the Court turned down a facial challenge to
literacy tests. The Court in Morgan left this holding undisturbed,
explaining that the question was not whether application of the
literacy requirement violated the equal protection clause. Rather,
the question in Morgan was whether section 4 (e) was
“appropriate legislation to enforce the fifteenth amendment.”86
The Court unsurprisingly concluded that it was, while asserting in
a controversial footnote that “Congress’ power under § 5 is limited
to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the
Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate,
or dilute these guarantees.”87 As in South Carolina, the Court was
deferential to a fault, explaining that “[i]t is enough that we be
able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve
the conflict as it did.”88 Testifying in front of the Senate during
the 1969 hearings, former Solicitor General Cox referred to
Morgan as “a token of congressional supremacy.”89
One initial impression from these early cases is quite cynical;
to wit, what could we possibly expect the Court to do instead?
haste. There were a lot of revisions that were made, as I think is true of almost
every law that is enacted, that there are changes made in committee, changes
made up to the last minute. Just because changes are made, just before the bill is
reported, you don’t say that the bill was drafted in haste.”).
82 South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 328, 334.
83 Id. at 328 (italics added).
84 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
85 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
86 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
87 Id. at 651 n.10.
88 Id. at 653.
89 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 334.
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While in the midst of the civil rights movement, the Court stepped
aside and let the revolution in its midst run its course, and in so
doing it became a partner in the making of civil rights law.
According to Lucas Powe, for example,
The Court was extending an offer to Congress to
become a full partner in the Court’s great tasks,
just as Congress had become with the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In
making the offer the Court saw that its views and
those of Congress were harmonious. Each was
working as hard as it could to improve American
life.90
This is an important point. I cannot underscore enough how
strongly the critics felt about the unconstitutionality of the bill. To
some, it was “based on emotionalism and is shot through with
weaknesses which I do not believe the Supreme Court could
possibly uphold;”91 and others, while professing a “strong enough
faith in the intellectual honesty of the members of that Court . . .
would not believe they would for 1 minute permit this
unconstitutional act to be upheld.”92 In making these claims, they
were asking the Court to side against the policy views of a very
strong national majority. Yet this is something the Court seldom
does.
Robert Dahl early work is instructive on this point. As he
concluded, “the policy views dominant on the Court are never for
long out of line with the policy views dominant among the law
making majorities of the United States.”93 Or, put in terms more
relevant to the voting rights decisions, the Court is, “[b]y itself . . .

90

LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT

AND

AMERICAN POLITICS 265

(2000).
91 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 629 (“I think this bill is)
(Senator Sparkman).
92 Id. at 678 (Watkins).
93 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court
as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957), reprinted in 50 EMORY
L.J. 563 (2001); see GLENDON SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING: THE POLITICAL
ROLE OF COURTS 13 (rev. ed. 1974) ("[T]he federal courts have always (and
correctly) been perceived by party leaders as a major instrument for exercising
control over the substantive content of public policy."); MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND
POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT: NEW APPROACHES TO POLITICAL JURISPRUDENCE
(1964)..
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almost powerless to affect the course of national policy.”94 This is
not to say that the Court plays no role at all, for it does; as Dahl
explained, “at its best[,] the Court operates to confer legitimacy,
not simply on the particular and parochial policies of the
dominant political alliance, but upon the basic patterns of
behavior required for the operation of a democracy.”95 It is telling
that Dahl wrote this essay almost a decade before the great civil
rights cases of the 1960’s, for these cases epitomize his view of the
Court. After Morgan and South Carolina, not only were Congress
and the Attorney General vindicated, but far more importantly,
the debate shifted ground in telling and quite important ways.
B. The Court Takes Charge: Interpreting Section 5
Once the Court issued its definitive rulings on the
constitutionality of the Act, the debate shifted in notable ways. To
94 Dahl, supra note 93, at 295; see LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT
271-72 (5th ed. 1995) (arguing that, while the Court has considerable
constitutional and political strength, its policymaking role is a limited one);
Thomas R. Marshall, Policymaking and the Modern Court: When Do Supreme
Court Rulings Prevail? 42 POL. RES. Q. 493, 503 (1989) (clarifying "the modern
Supreme Court's limits as a policy-maker within the context of American
politics").
This point provoked a long and persuasive response from Jonathan Casper.
Jonathan Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 50 (1976). According to Casper, the Court is a much more influential
policy making player than Dahl suggests. According to Dahl, for example,
“[a]cting solely by itself with no support from the President and Congress, the
Court is almost powerless to affect the Court of national policy.” Dahl, supra, at
293. For Dahl, winners are influential, losers are not. Yet, Casper argues, this
measure of “influence” is inaccurate at best. Simply because the laissez faire
policies of the Lochner court were eventually discarded, one cannot say that the
Court was not influential. As he states, “[t]he notion of a ‘winning’ and a ‘losing’
policy when institutions clash imposes an artificial distinction that obscures a
dynamic process in which even the ‘losers’ contribute importantly to outcomes
that eventually emerge.” Casper, supra, at 62. Under Dahl’s framing, “no
institution is really capable of the decisive role he argues.” See id. at 61. In the
end, Casper’s argument agrees with Dahl’s overarching conclusion that the Court
is a policy-making institution. Their disagreement stems mainly over the
question of influence.
95 Dahl, supra note 93, at 295. This claim of judicial legitimacy has an
impressive number of respected followers. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 29 (2nd
ed. 1986) (acknowledging his reliance on Black’s “most suggestive and perceptive
argument” that the Court plays a legitimizing role); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE
PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY (1960); David Adamany,
Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court, 1973 WISC. L. REV.
790 (1973).
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be sure, some critics refused to accept the Court’s arguments.
Prominent among these critics was Senator Sam Ervin, who by
1969 had assumed the chairmanship of the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Judiciary Committee. During the
1969 hearings over amendments and extensions to the Act, for
example, he remarked: “The Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional
in every respect notwithstanding what the Supreme Court said.”96
But by and large, this was a lost battle and a waste of energy, as
the debate clearly shifted to the substantive provisions of the Act.
And on this score, the Court clearly led the way.
The first case was Allen v. State Board of Elections.97 In
Allen, the Court examined section 5 of the Act and offered a broad
and expansive reading of the Act. As the Court explained, “[t]he
Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious,
state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens the
right to vote because of their race.”98 This clear intention, coupled
with the “weight of the legislative history,”99 led the Court to
conclude that Congress intended that “all changes, no matter how
small, be subjected to sec. 5 scrutiny.”100
Similarly, in Gaston County v. United States,101 the Court
offered a similarly expansive interpretation of section 4(a) of the
Act. Under this section, a covered jurisdiction wishing to reinstate
its suspended test or device must show that “no such test or device
has been used during the five years preceding the filing of the
action for the purposes or with the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race or color.”102 Gaston County
wished to make such a showing in federal court. But the District
Court denied it relief, for it concluded that the County’s history of
segregated and unequal education would mean that the literacy
test would have the effect of discriminating against blacks. While
underscoring its view that this was not a per se rule, and in an
opinion authored by Justice Harlan, the Supreme Court agreed.
Under section 4(a) of the Act, in other words, a reviewing court
may consider whether a literacy test would have the effect of

96 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 175; see id. at 357 (“I don’t
consider that Katzenbach v. Morgan is constitutional. . . . I also don’t think
South Carolina v. Katzenbach is constitutional.”).
97 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
98 Id. at 565.
99 Id. at 569.
100 Id. at 568.
101 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
102 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 89th Cong. § 4(a) (1965).
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denying the right to vote as a consequence of the jurisdiction’s
history of segregated and inferior schools.103
Critics and supporters alike agreed that these cases offered
broad interpretations of the Act.104 Unsurprisingly, the critics
went further, complaining that these decisions went beyond the
intent of the Congress. According to A. F. Summer, Mississippi’s
Attorney General, the 1965 Congress “never imagin[ed] the
lengths to which the courts would enlarge the application of the
act to include within its purview any State or local enactments.”105
Senator Ervin similarly complained that “[t]he Court has
rewritten the Voting Rights Act and made meaningless the release
provisions of section 4.”106
At first blush, these criticisms appear right on target. But the
Voting Rights Act is not a traditional statute, and the role of the
Court in this area has been nothing short of unorthodox.
Consider, for example, the words of Representative McCulloch,
offered during the 1969 hearings:
Section 5 was intended to prevent the use of most
of these devices. But apparently the States rarely
obeyed the mandate of that section, and the
Federal Government was too timid in its
enforcement, I hope that the case of Allen v. State
See Gaston County, 395 U.S. at 293.
See Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearings on H.R. 4249 and H.R. 5538
Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 62
(1969) [hereinafter 1969 House Hearings] (“The Department apparently took a
somewhat narrow view of the scope of section 5. Their position, however, was
expanded in the Supreme Court, where they filed an amicus brief in the Allen
case. And the Supreme Court interpreted section 5 very broadly in the Allen
case.” (Glickstein); Id. at 83 (“Most recently, the Supreme Court, in Allen v. State
Board of Education, has arbitrarily ruled that States covered by the act cannot
take any action, whatever the intent, which diminishes the effectiveness of Negro
voting rights. This, again, has nothing to do with discrimination.”) (Jack
McGann, Liberty Lobby)
105 1969 House Hearings, supra note 104, at 130; see id. (“Several
decisions, notably Allen v. State Board of Elections . . . have interpreted section 5
in a manner which Congress could hardly have contemplated.”) (A. F. Summer);
1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 369.
106 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 5; The Enforcement of the
Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before Civil Rts. Oversight Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 71 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 House Hearings]
(complaining that “in the Perkins case, I don’t think anyone, certainly not the
Attorney General of the United States nor us, anticipated that the expansion of a
city’s limits would be included under those things that had to be submitted under
the act”) (A. F. Sumner).
103

104
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Board of Elections, decided by the Supreme Court
on March 3, 1969, is the portent of change.107
Here was the House minority leader and a leading voice during
the 1965 debates, exhorting the federal government to do more
while looking to Allen for approval. Clearly, the minority leader
understood section 5 as a broad and necessary provision.108 Far
more tellingly, he remarked that thanks to Allen, “at long last after
4 years section 5 will become effective.”109
Representative McCulloch was hardly alone. Important in
this regard is the way in which members of Congress referred to
Allen and Gaston County during the 1969 hearings. Aside from
critics such as Senator Ervin, who pointed to these cases as
further proof that the sunset provisions of the Act should be
allowed to expire, supporters of the Act referred to these decisions
as part and parcel of the new statutory regime. More crucially,
supporters of the Act made arguments and staked positions
during the 1969 hearings that made use of Allen and Gaston
County as both accepted and crucial components of the
legislation. And clearly, talk of overturning these decisions was
also close to non-existent. That Congress held scheduled hearings
so close to these decisions yet chose not to overturn them speaks
volumes about the way in which Congress understood and
ultimately accepted these cases as consonant with the mission of
the Act.110
During the 1975 hearings, the debate over the Court’s
expansive interpretations of the Act was both subdued and
altogether different. As in previous hearings, some witnesses
Id. at 4.
Id. at 270 (“Section 5 must not be repealed or emasculated. The past
four years have proved that there are hundreds of ways to discriminate. Section
4 deals with literacy tests or devices. Section 5 deals with all of the rest.”).
109 Id. at 271. The Civil Rights Commission took a similar view. A Staff
memorandum dated July 8, 1969 argued that “until the Allen decision, referred
to previously, it had been unclear whether Section 5 applied to all election law
changes in the covered States, or only to those changes which dealt with voting
and registration.” 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 12, at 52. “Because the
Court has now made clear that Section 5 has a very wide scope,” the memo
continued, “States can now be expected to submit more statutes for approval.”
Id.
110 See, in this vein, Justice Thomas’ intriguing concurrence in Holder.
See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 929 (1994) (conceding that Congress had
interpreted section 5 expansively in Allen “and Congress has reenacted § 5
subsequent to our decisions adopting that expansive interpretation”) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
107

108
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offered unqualified support for the Court and its interpretations of
the Act.111 There were also criticisms, of course, but by this time
the critics were far more focused and pointed in their choice of
targets. They knew that fighting the Act or their judicial
interpretations on the merits would prove hopeless. They still
criticized the Court, to be sure, but while doing so they also asked
Congress for guidance and much-needed clarity in the field. This
muddiness was a problem, argued Daniel McLeod, South
Carolina’s Attorney General, because “it is very difficult and a very
onerous burden with the uncertainties brought into the picture by
reason of the application of the act to know which acts should be
submitted.”112 In this vein, Stone Barefield, a state representative
from Mississippi, similarly complained that the courts have
interpreted the Act far beyond the intent of Congress and “so that
I, as a legislator, and so that other legislators in the affected States
will know, pleased [sic] write into the Voting Rights Act by
definition what Congress intends to cover by standard practice
and procedure.”113
For my purposes, the most interesting and perhaps most
important testimony was that of Representative David Satterfield,
a fellow congressman from the commonwealth of Virginia. He
clearly took issue with the courts and their interpretations and
applications of the statute. Yet Congress was not powerless in the
face of a runaway judicial system, he complained, for these were
largely questions of statutory interpretation. Thus, as he wrote:
I consider it unfortunate that the act has been
construed by the courts to mean what they say it
means. I believe it is time now for Congress, by
specific amendments to make clear its position and
its precise objectives, especially with regard to
those court decisions which have interpreted the
act. There is an opportunity now, which should be
111 Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 939, H.R. 2148,
H.R. 3247 and H.R. 3501 Before Subcomm. on Civil and Const. Rights, 94th
Cong. 641 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 House Hearings] (“The significance of section
5 did not become apparent until 1969, when the Supreme Court in Allen v. State
Board of Elections clearly stated that this section covers changes that dilute black
citizens’ votes as well as simpler devices of disenfranchisement.”). (Armand
Derfner); id. at 717 (“I do not want to leave the impression that the court, in the
Allen case, enunciated something which the Congress did not intend.”) (Parker).
112 Id. at 581.
113 Id. at 707; see id. at 714 (“And that is why I have asked this committee
to seriously consider defining these standards, the practices and procedures that
we are dealing with.”).
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seized, for Congress to make it clear whether it
agrees with court interpretations and where it does
not to make clear what it does mean to say by this
act. I hope this committee will render special
attention to this opportunity.114
Minutes later, he repeated his request: “Frankly, I have difficulty
in finding in this act or the act’s legislative history the basis on
which the courts are making that decision. It would be my hope
that this subcommittee will address that point.”115 To which
Representative Don Edwards, the chair of the subcommittee,
responded: “Well, we will address that point.”116
But they didn’t. Representative Satterfield issued his request
on March 21, and the committee published its report
approximately six weeks later, on May 8.117 And curiously, not a
word was written on this issue. Instead, the Report extended an
approving nod towards the Court and its interpretations of the
Act, as it cited both Allen and Perkins while explaining that
around the time of the 1970 amendments to the Act, the Court
“gave broad interpretations to the scope of Section 5.”118 It is clear
that the House was fully aware of the Court’s broad
interpretations of the statute yet uninterested in cabining them.
So long as their views were in harmony, Congress need not pay
careful attention to its craftsmanship of the Act. So long, that is,
as the Court was willing to do the heavy lifting.
C. Shifting Ground and the Beauty of Counting to Five:
Beer’s Turn, Georgia’s Twists and the Bossiers
All too soon, however, the honeymoon came to an end. With
Beer v. United States,119 decided a year after the 1975 extension of
the Act, the Court began an apparent retreat from its earlier,
expansive interpretations of the Act. And in subsequent years, the
Court continued to display a penchant for interpreting the Act in
114 Id. at 730; see id. at 737 (explaining that the crux of the matter for him
was “whether or not the decisions of the courts, which to my mind have
converted the objective of this act from one to guarantee that there not be a
denial of the right to vote, and not to abridge the right to vote, to an enlargement
to say that you can not dilute the effectiveness of that vote”).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-196 (1975).
118 Id. at 9.
119 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
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narrow fashion. This last section examines three such instances:
Beer and Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board,120 which adhere to
the script of narrow interpretations of the Act; and Georgia v.
Ashcroft,121 a case that appears to turn away from this narrow
approach, and in so doing brings the doctrine full circle, to the
time of Allen and Gaston County.
1. Beer and the Standards of Preclearance

The question at the heart of the Beer litigation appeared to be
a relatively simple one: in applying section 5 of the Act, under
what standard must the district court or the Attorney General
assess whether a districting plan has the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on racial grounds? Upon inspection,
however, this question proved to be anything but simple, perhaps
unnecessarily so. After all, as the District Court recognized in an
opinion authored by Judge Spottswood Robinson III, “[t]he
legislative history of he Act establishes the full and firm allegiance
of its own objectives with the goals of the [Fifteenth]
Amendment.”122 In using “parallel language,” Congress signaled
its intention to enforce the dictates of the Fifteenth Amendment
without resorting to the traditionally time-consuming judicial
process.
In other words, it stands to reason that Congress simply
wished to shift the constitutional inquiry both temporally and
institutionally, to the Attorney General or the District Court,
before changes in the law took place, while also shifting the
burden of proof and placing it on the states and political
subdivisions. The standard under section 5 review would thus be
the same standard under the Fifteenth Amendment,123 with
section 5 acting as a prophylactic. The fact that Congress said
precious little about the particular standard that would govern
section 5 inquiries is telling, particularly since section 5 had

520 U.S. 471 (1997); 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539
U.S. 461 (2003).
122 374 F. Supp. 363, 382 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
123 See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 148 (1976) (contending that “it
is questionable whether the ‘purpose and effect’ language states anything more
than the constitutional standard”) (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. (Explaining that
section 5 cases “make clear” that the effects inquiry “is essentially the
constitutional inquiry”).
120
121
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become by 1975 the “centerpiece of the Act.”124 If the standard
were anything other than what common sense would appear to
dictate, surely Congress would have made its intentions far more
explicit.
The District Court in Beer understood its task under section 5
along these lines. To its credit, the district court conducted a
nuanced and fact-intensive inquiry, which highlighted the clear
and long-standing role played by race in the political and cultural
life of New Orleans.125 The court then looked to the doctrinal
structure provided by the Supreme Court’s reapportionment cases
and analogized its “abridgment” inquiry under the Act to the
Supreme Court’s vote dilution inquiry.126 In making this move,
the court made clear that “the question before us is not whether
New Orleans must confer upon its black citizens every political
advantage that a redistricting plan conceivably could offer.”127
Rather, plaintiffs must “press vigorously . . . for all that is their
due, but . . . no more.”128 Or, as former Attorney General
Katzenbach argued during the 1975 Senate hearings, “[w]hile
blacks have made important gains, these gains do not reflect the
political power of their numbers were there no discrimination.”129
The inquiry was essentially an inquiry of unconstitutional
vote dilution as commonly understood. Such an inquiry demands
a comparison between an optimal state of affairs and the
challenged circumstances. In this vein, the court explained that
“the relevant comparison is between the results which the
minority is constitutionally free to command and the results
Put
which the plan leaves the minority able to achieve.”130
another way, the comparison was between theoretical results free
of any dilutive influence and the actual results under the
challenged districting plan. On the facts, the court concluded that
the districting plan would unjustifiably dilute the black vote in
New Orleans. And “[s]urely the Fifteenth Amendment . . .

124 1975 House Hearings, supra note 111, at 40 (testimony of Hon. Arthur
Fleming, Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights).
125 See Beer, 374 F. Supp. at 374-75.
126 See id. at 383.
127 Id. at 389.
128 Id. at 390.
129 Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 407, S. 903,
S. 1297, S. 1409, and S. 1443 Before Subcomm. on Const. Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 125 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Senate
Hearings]
130 Beer, 374 F. Supp. at 388.
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discountenances the abridgment evident in this case.”131 Under
the factors of Zimmer v. McKeithen132 and recent vote dilution
case law,133 the court further concluded that the plan would
unjustifiably dilute the potential black voting strength in the
city.134 Finally, the court also concluded that the city had not
justified its use of tw0 at-large seats.
In an opinion authored by Justice Stewart, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed.135 Over a scant nine-page opinion, the Court
managed to turn what could be a difficult issue – if the lower court
opinion is any indication – into a simplistic one. The question
was the same: when does a districting plan have “the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color”? The Court began its analysis by pointing out that this
inquiry is not a constitutional inquiry but a question of statutory
interpretation.136 This meant, of course, that the legislative
history of the Act and the intent of Congress were controlling.
Then, after offering a smattering of quotes and cites from past
opinions and congressional reports, the Court shifted its gaze to
the 1975 House Report. In particular, the Court focused on the
following passage:
When it adopted a 7-year extension of the Voting
Rights Act in 1975, Congress explicitly stated that
“the standard (under s 5) can only be fully satisfied
by determining on the basis of the facts found by
the Attorney General (or the District Court) to be
true whether the ability of minority groups to
participate in the political process and to elect their
choices to office is augmented, diminished, or not
affected by the change affecting voting . . . .”137
From this passage, the Court spun out the following standard:
“the purpose of s 5 has always been to insure that no votingprocedure changes would be made that would lead to a
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to
their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”138 On this view,
Id. at 393.
485 F. 2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1972).
133 See Beer, 374 F. Supp. at 384-85.
134 See id. at 393-99.
135 See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
136 See id. at 139.
137 Id. at 141 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 91- 397, at 60 (1975)) (emphasis added).
138 Id.
131

132
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a section 5 inquiry would focus on the retrogressive effect of the
plan under review, and whether people of color were worse off
than under the baseline as established by the previous plan. Yet,
almost in passing, the Court offered what seemed an important
addendum: even if a plan is ameliorative in nature, it “cannot
violate s 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on
the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution.”139 Unless,
that is, the plan violates the Fifteenth Amendment.140
Under this standard, the Court looked to the previous plan,
enacted in 1961, and compared it to the plan under review.
Under the 1961 plan, people of color did not have any majorities
in any of the districts; yet, under the reviewed 1971 plan, they
would have one and maybe two such districts. From these facts,
the Court concluded that the reviewed plan did not violate the
effects prong of the preclearance requirement.
This is a questionable conclusion; at best, and as Justice
Marshall underscored in dissent, it is a contested reading of the
legislative history and the statutory language.141 One searches in
vain for support through the congressional hearings. The House
hearings in 1975 never mentioned the concept of retrogression as
the standard under which to measure the effects inquiry under
section 5, and neither did the 1971 House hearings by the Civil
Rights Oversight Subcommittee, from which the 1975 House
report drew its retrogression language.
When the Court writes that Congress “explicitly stated” its
understanding of the preclearance standard as one of
retrogression, it is thus hard to take even its language at face
value. Here is what Congress explicitly did: in the spring of 1971,
it held hearings on “The Enforcement and Administration of the
Voting Rights Act,” during which myriad references to section 5
were offered. Tellingly, none of these references made use of the
retrogression language. In January 1972, this same committee
Id.
Keeping with its newfound posture of narrow interpretations of the Act,
the Court managed to even restrict this seeming straightforward and logical
reading of the law. In Reno v. Bossier Parish, the Court remarked that “it is
entirely clear that the statement in Beer was pure dictum: The Government had
made no contention that the proposed reapportionment at issue was
unconstitutional. And though we have quoted the dictum in subsequent cases,
we have never actually applied it to deny preclearance.” 528 U.S. 320, 338
(2000).
141 Id. at 146 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (contending that the Court’s
conclusion “finds no support in the language of the statute and disservices the
legislative purposes behind s 5”).
139

140
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issued a report, “Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in
Mississippi,” where it recommended that the Department of
Justice step up its preclearance responsibilities, “particularly
where the change would have a substantial impact on the voting
rights of many people.”142
As for the preclearance standard, the Report explained that it
“is not fully satisfied by an indication that the administration of
the change affecting voting will be impartial or neutral.”143 Only
then did the Report go on to state the language later borrowed by
the 1975 Report and ultimately by the Court majority in Beer: the
standard is whether the ability of people of color to participate in
the political process and elect the representatives of their choice is
“augmented, diminished, or not affected by the change affecting
voting.”144 On its face, it is not altogether clear how the Beer
majority arrives at the retrogression standard from this paragraph
taken as a whole. And it gets better, for the majority left out the
best part. Right after the ellipses, the Court didn’t think necessary
to keep the following passage: “in view of the political,
sociological, economic, and psychological circumstances within
the community proposing the change.”145 So here is the relevant
passage, in full:
When it adopted a 7-year extension of the Voting
Rights Act in 1975, Congress explicitly stated that
“the standard (under s 5) can only be fully satisfied
by determining on the basis of the facts found by
the Attorney General (or the District Court) to be
true whether the ability of minority groups to
participate in the political process and to elect their
choices to office is augmented, diminished, or not
affected by the change affecting voting . . . .
“. . . in view of the political, sociological, economic,
and psychological circumstances within the
community proposing the change.”146

142 Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in Mississippi: A Report
of the Civil Rights Oversight Subcomm., 92nd Cong. 14 (1972) [hereinafter 1972
House Report].
143 Id.
144 Id. at 14-15.
145 Id. at 14-15.
146 Id. at 141 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 91- 397, at 60 (1975)) (emphasis added).
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With the added language, the passage might be said to offer
support for the lower court’s opinion in Beer, not the Court
majority. But the Court seemed intent in narrowing the scope of
the preclearance inquiry, and contrary legislative history would
not stand in its way, or even the fact that the litigants themselves
did not think to argue for the standard in their briefs as the Court
ultimately understood it.
Beer is also remarkable for the way in which the district
court’s analysis of the substantial meaning of section 5 differed
from that of the Supreme Court. Judge Robinson’s opinion is
expansive, nuanced and arguably more faithful to Congress’
expansive views of the purpose behind the Act than Justice
Stewart’s narrow opinion for the Court. During the 1975 debates
over extension of the Act, for example, the ninety-fourth Congress
explicitly recognized that questions of representation and political
fairness are difficult questions, and the question of discrimination
in the political process was then a question of vote dilution.147 In
this vein, it is clear that Congress in 1975 would side with Judge
Robinson’s opinion over Justice Stewart’s. But that is one beauty
of having five votes on the Court; one needn’t worry about being
right. And as for reading the statute narrowly, it is also clear that
this wouldn’t be the last time.
2. Bossier Parish and the Triumph of Retrogression

The 1990’s proved fertile ground for litigants challenging the
limits of the Act.
This was a time when many covered
jurisdictions had a very difficult time securing preclearance for
their districting plans, thus offering the Court myriad
opportunities to leave its lasting imprint on the preclearance
requirement. The attempt by the Bossier Parish School Board to
redraw its district lines to comport with the equipopulation
standard proved no exception. The Board’s plan, modeled after a
previously approved plan, was denied preclearance by the
Department of Justice because a plan presented to the Board by
the NAACP had been able to create two majority black districts,
whereas the submitted plan had none. More specifically, the
Attorney General had objected to the Board’s plan because, as
required by its own regulations, she must withhold preclearance
when “necessary to prevent a clear violation of amended section
147 See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Rethinking Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (Epstein et
al., eds., forthcoming 2006).
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2.”148 On appeal, the lower court precleared the plan,149 and the
Supreme Court ultimately faced two separate questions: whether
a violation of section 2 demands a denial of preclearance under
section 5; and whether the Attorney General must preclear a plan
enacted with discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose.
a. Uncoupling Section 2 from Section 5

In Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board,150 the Court
answered the first question in the negative. To the Court, making
a violation of section 2 a basis for denying preclearance under
section 5 would mean that the Department of Justice “would
‘routinely’ attempt to avail themselves of this new reason for
denying preclearance.”151 This would mean that “for all intent and
purposes” the standard of section 2 would replace the standard
under section 5, and the retrogression inquiry would be replaced
by a vote dilution inquiry. The Court soundly rejected this
position, for it contradicted existing doctrine and further
increased the “serious federalism costs already implicated by §
5.”152
This was a debatable conclusion, for it elevates the
retrogression inquiry above the structure of the Act and the intent
of Congress. On the first point, it is clear that Section 2 was
intended as a restatement of the 15th Amendment,153 and the bill
as a whole was aimed at enforcing the same amendment. In turn,
Section 5 was intended to prevent states from violating the 15th
Amendment in ways that Congress could not foresee in 1965. Or
as Armand Derfner explained during the 1971 Hearings, “Section 5
was a look down the road to prevent, in advance, stratagems
whose nature was unknown but which Congress knew would be
forthcoming when literacy tests were abolished.”154 As enacted in
148 See Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 520 U.S. 471, 476 (1997)
(citing 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b)(2).
149 See Bossier Parish School Board v. Reno, 907 F. Supp. 434 (D.D.C.
1995).
150 520 U.S. 471 (1997).
151 Id. at 477.
152 Id. at 480 (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926 (1995)).
153 See To Enforce the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States: Senate Unpublished Hearing on S. 1564, 89th Cong., Vol. I, 4
(1965).
154 The Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before Civil Rts.
Oversight Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 255
(1971) [hereinafter 1971 House Hearings].
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1965, then, it must be the case that Section 5 would incorporate
Section 2, for the crux of the preclearance requirement was
preventing future violations of the Fifteenth Amendment as
codified under Section 2. Put another way, Section 5 was not
concerned with the applicable standards under Section 2 as much
with the enactment of electoral provisions that would violate the
fifteenth amendment. And so long as Section 2 was a restatement
of the Fifteenth Amendment, Section 5 would by definition
incorporate Section 2. This argument has not only the legislative
record on its side, but logic – and perhaps experience – as well.
In fairness, the 1982 Amendments might be understood as
altering this reading of the Act. Yet, in fact, the congressional
reaction to City of Mobile, does not affect the larger argument. It
is worth noting, first and foremost, that Congress was responding
to yet another narrow reading of the statutory language; in City of
Mobile v. Bolden,155 the Court understood Section 2 as Congress
had understood it, as a restatement of the Fifteenth Amendment.
This meant, as the Court underscored, that the standard under
Section 2 would be one of discriminatory intent, rather than the
more flexible and forgiving standard of discriminatory effect.
Congress soon altered this reading of Section 2 in 1982,
uncoupling the statutory requirement from its constitutional
anchor and requiring a finding of discriminatory effect instead.
To the Court, this Amendment made all the difference in the
world. On their original rendition, the target of Sections 2 and 5
was the same, racial discrimination in voting, both in the present
and into the future. In amending the Act, however, Section 2
ceased to simply restate the constitutional standard as the Court
understood it. This had grave repercussions for the Section 5
inquiry and the argument that Section 5 incorporated a Section 2
inquiry, according to the Court in Bossier Parish. Namely, it
would shift the preclearance inquiry from non-retrogression to
vote dilution and call into question the Beer non-retrogression
standard. It would also raise the already serious “federalism
costs” exacted by Section 5, and in so doing might push the Act to
the brink of unconstitutionality.
Tellingly, the Court also
remained unimpressed by the Attorney General’s regulations,
which interpreted section 5 as requiring a denial of preclearance if
in violation of section 2; and by considerations of public policy,
which counseled against a grant of preclearance for electoral
changes that would ultimately violate Section 2.156
155
156

446 U.S. 52 (1980).
See Bossier Parish, 520 U.S. at 483-85.
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These arguments must be read in the context of the times and
the Court’s dissatisfaction with the Department of Justice’s
handling of its preclearance responsibilities.157 To the Court, the
Department of Justice had pushed its reading of the Act – a
reading that the Court understood as one of maximizing majority
minority districts – too far and ultimately rendered the resulting
state actions unconstitutional. Hence, Section 2 had ceased to be
a measure of the 15th Amendment but, rather, a tool of public
policy and the yardstick for what a proper structure of
representation would look like.158 On this view, it is easy and
perhaps unavoidable to conclude that Section 5 does not
incorporate Section 2.
It must be noted, however, how this posture comes in direct
tension with the classic voting rights decisions of the 1960’s and
the Court’s forgiving interpretations of congressional power.
Under Katzenbach v. Morgan,159 for example, the Court allowed
Congress the room to interpret rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond what the Court itself would recognize. Such
an argument under the Morgan power would mean that Congress
could interpret the Fifteenth Amendment under Section 2 of the
Act more expansively than the Court allowed in City of Mobile.
On this view, Section 5 would still incorporate Section 2 under
Congress’ reading of a constitutional violation under the
Amendment. But the Court was not interested in this argument.
Once Congress offered a different reading of the Amendment
through Section 2 of the Act, Section 5 could no longer be used to
enforce Section 2 into the future.160
Regardless of one’s stance about the Court’s views on
congressional power, it is also intriguing how the Court spends so
little time – if any – sorting through the legislative materials, and
how selective the Court chooses to be when doing so. In this vein,
recall how in Beer the Court was much too willing to ground the
doctrine on its debatable reading of the House report. Yet, in
Bossier Parish, the Court proved unwilling to accept language
157 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 917-18 (1995); Johnson v.
Miller, 864 F.Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (contending that by the third round of
submissions from Georgia to the Department of Justice, “[i]t was now clear to
the General Assembly that preclearance would not be forthcoming without
adopting this raison d'être of the max-black proposals. This goal dominated the
creation of the third Georgia submission.”); Ellen D. Katz, Federalism,
Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1179 (2001).
158 See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
159 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
160 See Bossier Parish, 520 U.S. at 481-82.
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from the House and Senate Reports that, according to Justice
Stevens and anyone willing to engage the Reports at all,
unequivocally expressed a congressional intent to incorporate
Section 2 within the preclearance dictates of Section 5. According
to the Senate Report, for example, “[i]n light of the Amendment to
section 2, it is intended that a section 5 objection also follow if a
new voting procedure itself so discriminates as to violate section
2.”161
In a subsequent report four years later, a House
subcommittee similarly concluded that “it is a proper
interpretation of the legislative history of the 1982 amendments to
use Section 2 standards in the course of making Section 5
determinations.”162 But the Court was not interested in such
technical matters. Its questionable adoption of the retrogression
standard in Beer ruled the day.
b. Turning the Act on its Head: Preclearing Discrimination

And two years later, in Bossier Parish II,163 it ruled the day
again. The question this time was whether the Department of
Justice must preclear a redistricting plan enacted with
discriminatory but non-retrogressive purpose. Unsurprisingly,
the Court also answered this question in narrow fashion,
construing the language of the statute as requiring a denial of
preclearance under the purpose prong of section 5 only for
retrogressive dilution.164 After Bossier Parish, the retrogression
standard would apply not only to the discriminatory effects
inquiry, but to the question of discriminatory purpose as well.
The best that can be said for this reading of the statute is that
it was “outlandish”.165 The Court began by looking to the relevant
language, under which a covered jurisdiction must show that its
proposed change “does not have the purpose and will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race
or color.”166 From this language, the argument was disarmingly
simple: if the effect prong of the statute required a retrogression
inquiry, the Court concluded that it must interpret the purpose
prong similarly since, “[a]s we have in the past, we refuse to adopt
S.R. Rep. No. 97-417, at 12 n. 31 (1982) (cited in Bossier Parish, 520
U.S. at 505-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
162 Voting Rights Act: Proposed Section 5 Regulations: Report 5 (1986).
163 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
164 See id. at 328.
165 Id. at 360 (Souter, J., dissenting).
166 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c).
161
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a construction that would attribute different meanings to the
same phrase in the same sentence, depending on which object it is
modifying.”167 Thus, following Beer, retrogression would become
the hallmark of the preclearance inquiry.
This is an outlandish conclusion because it does not even
pretend to comport with the structure of the statute and the intent
of Congress.
The reason for including a preclearance
requirement, according to Attorney General Katzenbach, was to
subject “the State which had been discriminating in the past . . . to
some kind of limitations as to any new legislation that it might
propose.”168 Or, as he explained during the Senate hearings, the
preclearance requirement “is an attempt to prevent new laws
which would frustrate the objectives of Congress here.”169 During
his testimony in front of the House subcommittee, Joseph Rauh
explained the need for the preclearance requirement as follows:
You are about, I take it, to pass legislation to
remedy previous discrimination. All you are saying
here is, “We are not going to permit-new evasive
devices, we are going to freeze the situation as it is
today unless new tests have been brought to court
and found to be nondiscriminatory.”
I would say this provision is simply self-defense of
Congress. The States you are now seeking to
prevent from discriminating— this is a way of
preventing those States from finding a new method
of discrimination. I think this is a necessary part of
the self-defense of the bill you are about to enact.170
If Section 5 stood for anything at all in the eyes of the 89th
Congress, it would be the view that the Attorney General must not
preclear electoral changes that discriminated on the basis of race.
Nothing that Congress did during the debates of 1969, 1975 or
1982 refute this central premise of the Act.
Yet to the Court, “this is simply an untenable construction of
the text.”171 Not only is the Court’s reading of the Act necessitated
Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 329.
1965 House Hearing, supra note 7, at 60 (Attorney General
Katzenbach).
169 1965 Senate Hearing, supra note 7, at 172.
170 1965 House Hearing, supra note 7, at 399.
171 Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 329.
167
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by the language of the statute, the Court argues, but a contrary
reading of the purpose prong as reaching non-retrogressive vote
dilution practices “would also exacerbate the ‘substantial’
federalism costs that the preclearance procedure already exacts . .
. perhaps to the extent of raising concerns about § 5’s
constitutionality.”172 And this might really be the crux of the
matter, irrespective of any congressional intent. Had Congress
really intended to reach non-retrogressive state actions through
the purpose prong of Section 5, the Court suggests that this would
be unconstitutional.
To be as charitable as possible, the Court’s position simply
makes no sense. Why couldn’t Congress determine that a purpose
inquiry could precede the implementation of a statute in covered
jurisdictions? The Court does not say. For support, it cites Miller
v. Johnson’s admonition that the Department of Justice’s
maximization policy extends beyond the reach of the statute and
is in direct tension with constitutional norms.173 But this hardly
offers any persuasive support. And further, the retrogression
standard was not a concession to any “serious federalism costs,”
but rather a simple matter of statutory interpretation and
legislative intent. To suggest that the adoption of any standard
other than retrogression would render the Act unconstitutional is
a baffling proposition. To be sure, the Court does not spend any
time defending this claim.
In the end, the Court offered a lawyerly brief, chock full of
technical arguments and distinguished cases. If a precedent
seemed to stand in its way, its conclusion would be “nothing more
than an ex necessitate limitation upon the effect prong in the
particular context of annexation;”174 or the case would “involve an
unusual fact pattern,”175 or contrary language would be “pure
dictum.”176 Such is the beauty of a Court majority and a
willingness to reach a particular outcome; counter arguments and
contrary cases seldom offer enough resistance.

Id. at 336.
See id. (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926-27 (1995)).
174 Id. at 330 (referring to Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358
(1975)).
175 Id. at 339 (referring to Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462
(1987)).
176 Id. at 338 (referring to language in Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130
(1976)).
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3. Georgia’s Misadventures Come to an End: Georgia v. Ashcroft

If Beer and the Bossier Parish cases show the beauty of
counting to five, a recent case, Georgia v. Ashcroft,177 shows a
different kind of beauty: if one waits long enough, legal doctrine is
likely to come full circle. In Georgia, the Court offered its latest
examination of the retrogression standard. This time around, the
standard took on a loose yet nuanced – and some might say
worthless – persona.178 The doctrinal terrain prior to Georgia
bears repeating: a voting change that discriminates against voters
of color must be precleared if non-retrogressive.179 In fact, the
retrogression inquiry cares little about how unconstitutional the
challenged plan may be; it only cares about whether the plan
“preserves ‘current minority voting strength.’”180 The Court in
Bossier Parish reached this conclusion on the strength of the
statutory language,181 and for good measure; had the Court
focused on the legislative history, the result would have been
different.
Be that as it may, Georgia is important for the way in which
the Court can be understood as connecting the inquiry back to the
concerns raised by Congress a generation before. Consider first
the inquiry as the Court understood it: to determine what an
“effective exercise of the electoral franchise”182 means. To the
Court, this inquiry “depend[ed] on an examination of all the
relevant circumstances, such as the ability of voters to elect their
candidate of choice, the extent of the minority group’s opportunity
to participate in the political process, and the feasibility of
creating a nonretrogressive plan.”183 This was a “totality of
circumstances” inquiry, the Court explained, and a flexible and
forgiving inquiry to boot. No one factor would be determinative
and, in specific reference to districting plans, jurisdictions would
retain much flexibility in choosing which theory of representation
to reflect in their plans.184

539 U.S. 461 (2003).
See Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of
Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J. 21 (2004).
179 See Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000).
180 Georgia, 539 U.S. at 477 (citing City of Lockhart v. United States, 460
U.S. 125, 134 n.10 (1983)).
181 Bossier Parrish, 528 U.S. at 328-33.
182 Georgia, 539 U.S. at 479.
183 Id.
184 See id. at 482.
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One way to read the Georgia case is as Justice Souter read it:
as leaving nothing of the preclearance inquiry as Congress must
have envisioned it. Consider in this vein the words of Attorney
General Katzenbach during the Senate hearings on the need for
preclearance:
It occurred to us that there are other ways in which
States can discriminate, and we have had
experience with State legislative efforts in other
areas, for example, limiting the registrars to very
short periods of time, or the imposition of either
very high poll taxes or property taxes which would
have the effect of denying or abridging rights
guaranteed under the 15th Amendment, that kind of
law should be covered, too.
This was put in with an effort of not letting a State
legislature
continue
past
practices
of
discrimination, preventing that or subjecting that
to judicial review, somewhat the same way that
State reapportionment plans are subjected to
judicial review in order to determine their
constitutionality.185
If this is in fact what the Johnson administration and the 89th
Congress had in mind for the preclearance inquiry, then clearly
there is very little left of it. Under modern doctrine, the courts
must preclear even those plans that are found to discriminate
against people of color; and under Georgia, reviewing courts must
read the facts flexibly and forgivingly, making a finding of
retrogression even more unlikely than originally presumed.
Under the law as it now stands, it is clear that very few plans will
be fail to gain preclearance.
Yet, for my purposes, Georgia has a silver lining as well.
Recall that in Allen, the Court offered an expansive view of the
right to vote and the coverage of the Act, recasting the
preclearance inquiry as inter alia a dilution inquiry. And in Beer,
the lower court similarly offered an expansive account of political
life in New Orleans, which made a finding of racial discrimination
in voting more likely. Georgia takes us back to these cases, if
obliquely so, and to the 1975 congressional hearings. The issue
then was one of political power and full and effective participation
185

1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 237.
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in the political process. These are the same issues that permeate
Georgia’s majority opinion. I do not wish to be misunderstood,
however; I agree with Justice Souter’s dissent that this view of
retrogression empties section five of any remaining substantive
content. Looking back to the early congressional debates and the
clear goals of the Act, and when thinking about the misadventures
in the redistricting terrain during the 1990’s in North Carolina,
Texas, and Georgia, to name a few leading examples, it is not clear
whether this is such a bad thing after all.

IV. Conclusion: The Ebbs and Flows in Voting
Rights Law, and Looking Ahead to Reauthorization
The previous Part offered a simple and straightforward lesson:
the substance of the Act has ebbed and flowed in accordance with
the Court’s composition and its predetermined notions of
congressional powers and the natural reach of the Act. In the
early years, the Court stepped aside and offered a broad reading of
congressional powers and the reach of the Act. This posture was
in synch with the legislative history and congressional wishes; in
light of the many uncertainties surrounding the Act and its
constitutionality, Congress drafted a statute in broad and
forgiving language. The Court in the early years of the Act
followed the congressional script and behaved in true Dahlian
fashion, as a member of the national policy-making coalition. The
Court could have stood in the way of Congress and civil rights, to
be sure, but it seldom does so, and the mid-1960’s were not an
exception to this rule.
The election of President Nixon’s election in 1968 marked a
period of retrenchment on civil rights. This changing posture is
reflected during the 1969 reauthorization debates in Congress.
These hearings saw Attorney General Mitchell speak on behalf of
the administration and defend its push to expand the reach of the
Act nationwide.
The Attorney General disputed this
characterization, of course; as he repeated numerous times during
his testimony, the administration’s position should not be
interpreted as a retrenchment on the promise, but simply as a way
by which to apply the tenets of the Act on a fairer basis. But many
members of Congress remained unpersuaded. To them, the
administration was simply following through on its Southern
Strategy, a promise to the Southern states to turn back on the
goals of the Voting Rights Act.
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Congress did not agree with the administration on this key
issue of coverage and extended the Act for another five years
virtually unchanged. But supporters of the administration’s goals
would not have to wait long. In the case of Beer v. United States,
and in true Dahlian fashion, a Supreme Court majority – with 3
new Nixon appointees in tow – began to restrict the scope of the
Act through narrow interpretations of the statutory language. It
mattered little that neither the text nor the legislative history
offered much support for these new and unforgiving
interpretations of the statute. This was to be expected, as the
national mood had clearly shifted ten years after conditions had
proven to be ideal for passage of a strong voting rights bill.
To be sure, the pendulum swung again towards broad
interpretations of the statute; the case of Gingles v. Thornburg,
for example, may be considered one such instance, and U.S. v.
Board Of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama,186 decided in
1978, is clearly another. In the 1990’s, the pendulum swung back
with a vengeance; in case after case, from Presley v. Etowah
County187 to Shaw v. Reno188 and Miller v. Johnson189 to the
Bossier Parish cases, the Court once again interpreted the
statutory language in narrow fashion. As the Court adjusts to its
new membership and looks ahead to the coming reauthorization
battles, and if its behavior is any indication, the national mood is
clearly against expansive, intrusive interpretations of the Act.
This development has been nothing short of ironic. Public
discourse is often filled with talk of strict constructionism and
judicial activism. The debate often fails to cross party and
ideological labels, with so-called strict constructionists often
found right of center and those who believe in the notion of a
living Constitution found to the left. In recent days, for example,
Justice Scalia referred to those who refer to the Constitution as a
living document as “idiots.”190 Yet, as this Article argues, the life
of the Voting Rights Act in Court has turned this orthodoxy on its
head. Congress clearly wished for the Court to expand the scope
of the Act aggressively, to the limits of constitutional
interpretation, and the Court in the early years did precisely that.
435 U.S. 110 (1978).
502 U.S. 491 (1992).
188 509 U. S. 630 (1993).
189 515 U.S. 500 (1995).
190
Scalia Raps 'Living Constitution', http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2006/02/14/supremecourt/main1315619.shtml (last visited March 2,
2006) ("You would have to be an idiot to believe that. The Constitution is not a
living organism, it is a legal document.")
186
187
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But these early examples proved to be exceptions rather than a
matter of course, and soon enough Congress could no longer
count on the Court to carry out its statutory purposes.
As we look to 2007 and the looming reauthorization battle, it
is clear that Congress must be clear in its intentions. Whatever
Congress wants done, it must explicitly state as part of the
congressional record and the language of the statute. Otherwise,
and if the life of the Act is any indication, Congress must be
content with the likely possibility that the Court will read the
resulting congressional handiwork narrowly. To be sure, and if
the Bossier Parrish cases are any indication, it may be said that
Congress does not stand a chance, as the Court will do with the
statute whatever it decides to do. Nothing less can be expected
from an institution that seldom deviates from the national mood
and larger trends in public opinion. And yet, at least if it wishes to
have a clear say during the early years of a reauthorized Act, it
should be amply clear that Congress must say what it means and
mean what it says. For, if Congress leaves it up to the Court, it
might not like the results it gets.
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